Yemen Is Gone — And Global Powers Are Letting It Happen
By Lawrence Lease
If you look at a map of Yemen dated December 1, 2025, it’s already wrong. In just two weeks, a separatist group called the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has upended nearly a decade of assumptions about the country’s balance of power. Through a rapid, coordinated lightning offensive, the STC seized Yemen’s southern coastline, its most valuable oil fields, and the overwhelming majority of the territory once governed by the Cold War–era state of South Yemen.
Their goal is no longer ambiguous. The STC isn’t fighting for leverage inside Yemen. It’s fighting to erase Yemen as it currently exists and replace part of it with a new sovereign state — one they intend to rebuild in their own image.
What’s more striking than the speed of the takeover is the reaction to it. Yemen’s internationally recognized government has been largely powerless. The Houthi rebels, usually quick to exploit chaos, have mostly stood back. And global powers — who normally bristle at the idea of new countries forming by force — are signalling something unusual.
They’re not panicking. They’re watching. And some of them appear open to the idea that this time might be different.
A Country Once Divided Three Ways
Before December, Yemen existed in a fragile three-way split.
The STC controlled much of the south, backed militarily and politically by the United Arab Emirates and reinforced by elite local fighting units. The internationally recognized Republic of Yemen held the eastern interior, including key oil-producing regions, with Saudi Arabia as its primary sponsor. Meanwhile, the Houthi movement dominated the west, including the Red Sea coastline and the most densely populated areas of the country, operating as an Iranian-aligned proxy force.
On paper, the balance looked stable — three factions, each too strong to be easily displaced.
That assumption collapsed almost overnight.
With Emirati-supplied armoured vehicles and artillery, and with carefully negotiated non-aggression deals struck with Saudi-backed tribal militias, the STC tore through government-held territory. Province after province fell. Oil fields were captured. Borders with Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the Arabian Sea came under STC control.
By the time the dust settled, the STC had reclaimed virtually all of the territory once governed by South Yemen between 1967 and 1990 — and then some.
Most importantly, they consolidated total control of Aden, the vital port city that had long served as a symbolic seat of Yemen’s fractured government presence in the south. Any remaining illusion of shared authority there is now gone.
At this point, the STC’s military objectives inside former South Yemen appear complete.
And remarkably, no one is seriously trying to stop them. Saudi Arabia Blinks — And That Matters
Perhaps the clearest signal that something fundamental has changed is Saudi Arabia’s response.
Riyadh could have pushed back. It could have armed loyalist forces, pressured tribal allies, or escalated its quiet rivalry with the UAE. Instead, it accepted the loss.
Saudi-backed militias have entered long-term non-aggression arrangements with the STC. Yemeni government officials have been resettled elsewhere. Saudi and Emirati personnel are now coordinating on the ground to prevent further instability in STC-held areas.
This isn’t resistance. It’s damage control.
And it strongly suggests that Saudi Arabia has decided the southern map is no longer worth fighting over.
Why the STC Isn’t Being Treated Like “Just Another Rebel Group”
Normally, when a rebel faction declares itself a new country, the global response ranges from dismissive to hostile. The world doesn’t like new borders, especially ones created through force. Since 2000, only a handful of new states — like Montenegro and South Sudan — have successfully gained international recognition.
So why is the STC being taken seriously?. Part of the answer lies in comparison.
The STC is not innocent. Its past includes extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, torture, and looting. Those crimes are real, and they matter.
But here’s the uncomfortable truth: the world hasn’t been paying much attention to them.
And during this offensive, the STC has been unusually restrained. Casualties have been limited. Large-scale atrocities haven’t been reported. The ratio of territory captured to blood spilled has been, by modern conflict standards, shockingly low.
. In geopolitical terms, that restraint counts. So does governance. In areas it controlled before the offensive, the STC managed basic services, maintained relative stability, and did the bare minimum required to function as a governing authority in a country ravaged by war and famine.
For international decision-makers accustomed to far worse options, that starts to look… acceptable.
The Houthi Problem — And the STC’s Opportunity. If the STC has a selling point, it’s this: the Houthis.
From the perspective of much of the world, the Houthis aren’t just rebels. They’re a persistent, disruptive security threat. They’ve attacked shipping in the Red Sea, damaged global trade, fired long-range strikes at Israel, and proven extraordinarily difficult to deter.
Saudi Arabia tried to crush them and failed. A U.S.-led naval coalition struggled to contain them. Israeli airstrikes haven’t changed their behavior. The internationally recognized Yemeni government never stood a chance.
The STC sees that failure as its opening.
Even before consolidating its southern gains, STC leaders began publicly framing themselves as the force capable of confronting Yemen’s militant problem. They launched “Operation Decisive,” an anti-terror campaign targeting al-Qaeda cells in Abyan province — not the Houthis, but close enough to make the message clear.
Give us legitimacy, the STC is saying, and what follows is counterterrorism.
Saudi Arabia publicly objected. Then did nothing. That silence speaks volumes.
Independence or Something Bigger?
Would the STC actually fight a full-scale war against the Houthis?
Probably not — at least not yet. The Houthis are formidable defensive fighters, relying on drones, booby traps, and asymmetric tactics. An offensive war would be costly for both sides, and neither appears eager to start one.
But the STC may not need to. From a diplomatic standpoint, it only needs to appear willing.
With Emirati backing and apparent Saudi acquiescence, the STC can now make a credible pitch to Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing: recognize us, and we become a stabilizing counterweight in one of the world’s most dangerous regions.
Compared to the Houthis, the STC looks pragmatic. Compared to Yemen’s government, it looks competent. And compared to many separatist movements, it looks organized, disciplined, and — crucially — useful.
How New Countries Actually Get Made
International recognition isn’t about morality. It’s about incentives.
Groups that succeed tend to check the same boxes: limited recent atrocities, a plausible governing structure, regional support, minimal risk of triggering a wider war, and — above all — alignment with global interests.
The STC checks more of those boxes than most.
Yemen is already viewed as a failed state. The Republic of Yemen barely functions. The Houthis are widely disliked. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on board. Oman doesn’t care, as long as its border stays quiet. And opposing the STC would require effort, money, and attention that few governments are eager to spend..
From a cold geopolitical perspective, the question isn’t “Why recognize them?” It’s “Why not?”
Whether the STC becomes the state of South Arabia — or something even more ambitious — remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: the world is no longer treating them as a temporary rebellion.
They’re being treated like a government-in-waiting. And Yemen’s map may never look the same again.
https://vocal.media/fyi/yemen-is-dead-here-s-what-will-replace-it